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Executive Summary

Title: The Grant Administration and the Northern Plains Indians: A Failed Attempt at Peace and Cohabitation

Author: Major Justin J. Hall, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: President Ulysses S. Grant's policies in dealing with the conflicts between the white settlers and the Northern Plains Indians sought for peaceful solutions, with the use of the Army as both a sustainment and amelioration force.

Discussion: Westward expansion into the Northern Plains produced great challenges for the United States. From the 1850s to 1880s, the clash between white settlers and the tribal nations of the Sioux, Crow, and other tribes forced the political leaders of the United States to deal with the problems associated with cohabitation of two vastly different cultures. The early nineteenth century policy of Indian removal to the west was no longer an option for two primary reasons: First, expansion west had already reached the Pacific Coast, to include the completion of the trans-continental railroad, and with it came opportunities in gold, other minerals, and farm and ranch land; the population of white settlers thus rapidly increased. Second, the tribes of the Northern Plains Indians were primarily nomadic hunter-gatherer societies and required expansive territories rich with wildlife resources to support their way of life, i.e., their culture. In summary, a clash between two incompatible ways of life loomed.

The so-called Indian problem was extremely complex; it involved numerous tribes and spanned many decades. The problem stemmed from vast differences in cultural, political, and religious ways of life. Complicating this was communication barriers of language and understanding, not only between the government officials within administration in charge of dealing with the tribes, but also amongst the different tribes themselves. Language and culture differences led to multiple communication gaps, even with the use of interpreters.

This study focuses on the political problem, which was riddled with shortcomings on both sides. On the Indian side, the chiefs were often forced into political positions of power which were not a perfect fit for the tribal way of life. Chiefs gained status through lineage or by warrior prowess. The chiefs had the tribe's best interest in mind, but some may not have been the best political leaders. For the United States government, the Bureau of Indian Affairs superintendents and commissioners often used their position to gain power and wealth whilst neglecting their responsibilities. These problems led to broken promises, which fueled the mistrust. When necessary the government also used the Army as the constabulary force of the west to protect white settlers and peacefully move the noncompliant Indians to the reservation. Unfortunately, peace could turn into war and this has left a negative connotation on the Army's involvement of the western settlement of the United States.

Conclusion: President Grant's policies were extensions of foundations set by previous administrations, but he focused on the peaceful movement of the tribes to the reservation with an attendant change of life and culture. Ultimately the Grant Administrations' policies were a failed attempt to bring two vastly different cultures to a means of cohabitation that was agreeable to both sides. This resulted in there being nothing left to negotiate, thus the Northern Plains Indians were overtaken by white settlement and the Army used forceful means to accomplish the ultimate goal of their movement onto reservations.

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Preface

This paper is designed to examine the United States government policies in dealing with the indigenous peoples of the Northern Great Plains in the time of westward expansion by white settlers. It is my goal to help others gain a greater understanding of how the tribal nations of the Sioux and Crow Indians evolved into their current situation and examine the challenges of President Grant's administration at the climax of the clash between the Plains Indians and settlers in the 1870s. The use of the military to dispel problems and conflicts between Indians and white settlers has left in many people's eyes a black mark on the Army in this period of history. It is my goal to examine the issues the Grant administration faced and explore how they approached dealing with the "Indian Problem" as defined by that era.

My interest in this subject comes from my upbringing in Great Falls, Montana, with its high population of Native Americans. As part of my youth this involved deer hunting experiences adjacent to the Rocky Boy Indian Reservation in Kremlin, Montana. On these deer hunts with my good friend, Joel Cotnoir who is part Chippewa Cree, we were hosted by Joel's grandparents on their small wheat farm. Joel's grandmother, MaryAnn "Gana" Reum, was a full blood Chippewa Cree. The establishment of the reservation on the other side of the fence from where we hunted was something about which I always wanted to have a better understanding.

This topic is also an interesting one to me as a Marine due to its relevance in the contemporary era with respect to the cultural clashes between two peoples. It is easy to see parallels between the challenges the United States faced in the 1870s in understanding the Indian culture, or failure to understand it, and those we face today in understanding the cultures of other nations and societies. There are similarities with the cultural misunderstanding and religious

differences between the white settlers and the American Indians of the 19th century and the cultural and religious differences the nation faces today as we deal with other countries, societies, and cultures within the global community. Hopefully through this lens, readers will take away an historical example of the importance in understanding different cultures and the inherent problems therein, and the ensuing consequences that can arise if a common understanding is not achieved. In other words, culture is important and needs to be studied. Furthermore, just because one lives in the same region, has the same ethnicity, and follows the teachings of the same religion does not mean those people have the same culture.

The clash of cultures between the Native Americans and Euro-American settlers spans a broad time period and many of the 19th century administrations had intimate dealings with this issue. The following study focuses on President Ulysses S. Grant's administration and its dealings with the Northern Great Plains Indians, specifically the tribal nations of the Sioux and Crow. Similar studies of the Grant administration's policies and efforts at implementation with other tribes could be made; however, that is beyond the scope of this paper due to time and page constraints. Countless events and dealings with many other Native American tribes shaped the policies and events of the period before and during 1869-1877 (the time President Grant was in Office). However, only the foundations of the Indian policies, pivotal events, and the establishment of organizations and treaties outside this time period will be addressed. This will provide context and understanding of the challenges the Grant Administration faced.

The Indian Wars of the 19th century have been studied and written about extensively with many different viewpoints and conclusions brought forth. For this project, I relied heavily upon the works of Robert M. Utley, Francis Paul Prucha, and John S. Gray. Their studies of the Northern Plains Indians are not only extensive but objectively done. Their works bring out many

cultural and political issues that are not as closely examined in other scholarly works, especially of Indian wars era. The cultural and political issues they examined in their books related directly to my project and were very useful in my research.

Dr. Donald Bittner was my mentor for this project. Dr. Bittner's extensive knowledge of the American Indians was of great help to me. He immediately pointed me in the right direction towards the sources to research. This gave me the direction and motivation to see the project through. Dr. Bittner's approach to setting up outlines and initial shells for the components of the paper was of great use in order to strive to meet deadlines in a compressed time frame. Lastly, I must thank my family for their constant support in all that I do in my military career, most importantly to my wife, Heather, and my two children, Jaxon and Samantha. This would not have been possible without their continued patience and support.

Prologue

Foundations of United States Indian Policies

The foundations of Indian policies were forged in the early history of the United States; many of these originated in the colonial era and continued into the first decades of the 1800s. From the colonial era to the early 1800s the overarching theme in dealing with the Indians was a combination of removal to the unused land to the West, which at that time was no further than the Shenandoah Valley, or by making treaties to provide separation. King George III's famous proclamation of 1763, which prevented colonists from moving into lands west of the Appalachians, is one example establishing boundaries to separate the two cultures and attempt to curb westward encroachment (Appendix A).¹ When the United States gained its independence from the British, it inherited the perceived Indian issue at a time when land was a most valuable economic resource and the Treaty of Paris conceded the young nation the rights to land all the way to the Mississippi River.

From the very beginning, the government used its abundant land resource in an attempt to separate the two incompatible cultures. Unfortunately, it failed to take into account rapid growth of population and ensuing movement west into land indigenous peoples inhabited and settlers wanted. The result was a continuing cycle of a conflict. In Joseph Ellis' book *American Creation*, he submits the failure of the founding fathers to deal with this problem was one of their greatest blunders. While they had monumental achievement in creating the government, the founding fathers failed to muster their creative energies when it came to what was called the Indian problem.² Either they deemed the problem insolvable or, more likely, deferred it to the future and failed to foresee the degree of growth and expansion of the new nation with the

ensuing attendant difficulties. Even if the latter was true it does not explain the limited energies the early statesman put forth on how to deal with the Indians. Were the tribes to be treated as separate sovereign nations or incorporated as citizens? The government treated the Indians both with a paternalistic and humanitarian view and dealt with them as sovereign nations. Regardless, their failure and early administration under the new constitution laid the foundation for many failed policies to come.

American statesman of the early 1800s sought to civilize and educate the Indians in attempt to absorb them into the dominant Anglo-American culture. The Indians were not thought of as inferior beings, but it was clear there was a sense of inequality with respect to religion, ways of life, and culture. Thomas Jefferson believed the Indians were equal to whites as humans but were far inferior in their way of life. As a powerful statesman of the era, the third president's Age of Reason ideas helped establish early government policies. Jefferson, like other founding father leaders, believed that with exposure to education, the rewards of civilization, and assistance from the white man, the Indians would advance and change their lives, into a settled agrarian lifestyle.³ In its formative years, the United States treated the Indian tribes as sovereign nations and made political agreements with them, but even at the time the country was progressing rapidly, particularly in population, with a definite advantage of power. As Thomas Jefferson stated in a letter to a territorial governor in 1803, "We presume our strength and their weakness is now so visible, that they must see we have only to shut our hand to crush them."⁴

However, as attempts to civilize and educate met resistance and failed with the tribes, more needed to be done. This resistance to the change in way of life is where the friction between the two peoples arose. In the early decades of the United States, expansion to the west was rapid and the country turned inward to establish itself (Appendix C). The wave of white

settlers continued their incursion into the lands to the west and the government had no means or desire to stop it. However, it did have the desire and responsibility to protect white settlers when conflict arose.

The treaty system, inherited from the British, created many problems. The treaties were an abuse of the system. It was used as an alternative way to gain territory because following the Mexican War the United States lacked both the public support and the military strength to wage all out war against the tribes. This led to the removal to uninhabited land to the west to achieve separation for the two incompatible cultures (Appendix B). A serious problem with the treaty system existed: neither the United States Government nor the various tribal chiefs had the power to uphold the contracts they signed.⁵ The treaties ultimately gave the government a legal basis for action from its legalistic interpretation of terms when these were violated. Also, later treaties could negate previous ones. Initially, the treaty system, using removal to allocated land or reservations, had success. This was particularly with the more sedentary tribes, but when it came to the plains Indians the treaty system merged into removal to a defined reservation, a goal counter to their nomadic way of life. It thus became a catastrophic failure. The idea of making treaties was the governments' way of putting band aids on what would later become gaping wounds. Nonetheless, part of this process caused the use of power to restrict the tribes and make treaty terms that the chiefs were incapable of rejecting because of their fear of further encroachment.⁶ These views of the early government permeated throughout the ensuing decades. Many of the government officials sought for peace, but their self-righteous and paternalistic attitudes towards the tribes became a contributing factor to many problems to come.

The early military involvement with the Indian is another area that requires examining for understanding of later policies to come. Shortly after the Revolutionary War the United States

continued to expand into the frontier. This expansion met immediate resistance from the Indians of the old Southwest and Northwest Territories, especially present day Ohio for the Northwest and Alabama and Florida for the Southwest. As the new United States established itself and developed into a new nation, control of the potentially prosperous lands to the west was paramount. Quelling Indian resistance through the establishments of forts and outposts became a major role of the Army.⁷ Along with the establishments of forts, the Army also engaged in punitive strikes against hostile tribes. The Army met both success and defeat in their early operations, but regardless of the outcome it led to the military playing a major role in the expansion of the country and an intimate involvement with what became the “Indian Problem.”⁸

As westward expansion continued, an important development in military and civilian relationships occurred with the assignment of Indian agents. Indian agents were directed by the War Department to get assistance from the military commanders in charge of the various forts, posts, outposts, and stations throughout the frontier when necessary. This direction required a close working relationship between agents and the military commanders. This relationship proved successful in some cases, but many problems arose when the enforcement of laws and treaties were required. Because the Indian agents did not have the manpower or ability to enforce the laws, they called upon the Army for assistance. This essentially placed the Army in a constabulary role handling problems the Indian Agents were not equipped for. The post commanders were not comfortable with this and were slow to cooperate with any requests from the agents, even though the Indian agents had backing from the War Department. The Army officers believed they were at a base for military defense, not as an arm of justice.⁹

The Indian Department was initially not a formal organization. The agents of the Indian Department were nominated by the President and approved by the Senate. They were primarily

responsible for enforcing policy and reporting all happenings in their respective territories to the War Department. In 1824, Secretary of War, and later Vice President, John C. Calhoun gave more structure to the department by creating the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Calhoun did this on his own initiative, without any direction or approval from Congress. Calhoun assigned Thomas L. McKenney as its head. The Bureau (still referred to as the Indian Office or Office of Indian Affairs) was responsible for the handling of all reports received from the agents in the field, as well as the appropriations for annuities, approval authority for vouchers and expenditures, decision authority on claims between whites and Indians under the intercourse laws, and to administer the civilization fund for the Indians. The tasks were daunting and McKenney appealed to Congress for a more robust department. Eventually, in 1832, Congress approved the establishment of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs under the Secretary of War.¹⁰ In 1850 another change occurred when Indian affairs were separated from the War Department and placed with the newly created Department of Interior. However the relationship had been established and developed between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Army thus they continued in shared responsibilities throughout the 19th century. The Bureau would never be robust enough to handle the problems and responsibilities it faced, thus the Army was continually called in for security.¹¹

The final element of the foundation of policies appeared in the Jackson Administration: Removal of the tribes to west of the Mississippi. Historians credit Andrew Jackson for the Indian removal policies, but its foundations had been previously forged with British colonial and early statesmen policies toward the indigenous peoples (see Fred Anderson's Introduction in *The War That Made America*). Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase contributed to this by providing extensive lands for potential removal. Three of President Jackson's predecessors,

Madison, Monroe, and Adams, all favored policies of removal. History has focused on Jackson because his administration enacted the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 called for an exchange of lands with Indians residing east of the Mississippi for lands west of the river. The Removal Act, intended to be a voluntary exchange of land, was anything but, and eventually led to wars and further treaties. It also led to tragedies, such as the famous “Trail of Tears” of the Cherokee in the fall and winter of 1838 and 1839.¹²

In summary, many of the Grant administration Indian policies received their origins from the British Colonialists and the early political leaders of the newly established United States. Treating tribes as sovereign entities was inherited from the British. The new government sought to acquire desired land via negotiation and treaty rather than through conquest. However, inherent in its policies consequently would be the implied requirement for the tribes to change their way of life. To implement these negotiations and treaties the government used the Army and established the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Finally, removal from the east to the west ensued, and then west of the Mississippi from removal of agreed lands to clearly defined reservations. The intentions of the early statesman to treat the Indians with humanity and sovereignty also included attempts to civilize, educate, and acculturate them. One of the major problems with the Indigenous peoples was westward expansion of white populations, which the government was fully supporting and enabling.¹³ In the first half of the 19th century, “Manifest Destiny” became a common theme with the ideas of nationalism, growth for a strong economy, and a prosperous nation. These would continue to cause a clash of two incompatible cultures.



Delegation of Arikaras, Gros Ventres, and Mandans meet with President Grant, 1874. (Photo courtesy of the State Historical Society of North Dakota, Col. 0384-01-1)

Some of the more sedentary tribes of the Northern Plains were longtime enemies of the Sioux and agreed to work with the United States Government as scouts to help the Army seek out the Sioux hostiles. Unfortunately, this only complicated the problem of establishing peace and cohabitation among the Settlers and the Indians.¹⁴



Six of Custer's scouts who accompanied him at The Battle of Little Bighorn. Although the scouts warned him of the danger that lay ahead, he was insistent on striking before the Indian camp could scatter. Only Mitch Boyer died at the battle.¹⁵

Introduction

When President Ulysses S. Grant took office in 1869, the United States was coping with post Civil War reconstruction in the south and westward expansion into the northern plains. President Grant not only inherited the problems of Civil War reconstruction and a federal government with looming debt problems, but the new chief executive also confronted Indian problems in the west.¹⁶ The new president's policies with regard to the conflicts between the White settlers and the Northern Plains Indians sought peaceful reconciliation of issues, with the use of the Army as an amelioration force; however, the use of military force as a last option always existed. The challenges he would face in achieving these policy goals would be monumental.

In the two decades leading up to the Civil War, the Indian problem in the trans-Mississippi west worsened. The population of white settlers moving west with its attendant development was growing rapidly and any chance of separating the whites and Indians was unlikely. The states of California, Oregon, and Texas had been admitted to the Union. The newly formed Department of Interior and its Indian Bureau were ill-equipped to deal with the issues it confronted in the region. Using the solution of removal was no longer a viable option. The new solution would become confinement to reservations, coupled with education and civilization. In 1856, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George W. Manypenny, in his annual report to Congress first mentioned the idea of reservations. He stated that "appropriate steps be taken to designate suitable tracts or reservations of land, in proper localities, for permanent homes for, and provide the means to colonize, them thereon."¹⁷ In 1862, a later report identified some of the inadequacies of the reservations. A few of them, Commissioner William P. Dole noted, are summarized as follows: The tracts of land are far too small for the "blanket Indians"

(nomadic hunter gatherer Indians) who refused to give up their way of life, white settlers surround the reservations and the Indians feel they are in a pathway of a race with whom they are not compatible, and the Indians are being forced to abandon their way of life for one which puts them in direct competition with the race who is forcing injustices on them. Despite Commissioner Dole's concerns, he contradicted the inadequacies he identified by believing the reservation system would work and his report stressed the importance of confining the Indians to the reservation while at the same time gradually teaching the ideas of individual land allotments held in severalty.¹⁸ President Grant inherited many of these unrealistic and optimistic views, but failed to understand that the Indians culture and way of life would not quickly fit into the dominant society's land ownership principles. In fact, the Indians believed a group or person could not own "territory" and land resources were free to be used by all.

The Civil War temporarily postponed confronting the Indian problem while also having detrimental effects on Indian relations in the west. Many of the Army officers of the frontier either resigned and joined the Confederacy or were sent east to fight for the Union. Withdrawn regular forces were and often replaced by volunteers. During these years, many of the warring tribes such as the Sioux felt a sense of accomplishment when many of the forts in the frontier were abandoned. This sense of confidence made peaceful outcomes difficult in the post-Civil War years when the white settlers and the railroad began pushing west into tribal lands. Issues arose with passage rights and the use of land, especially when settlement became the focus of government.¹⁹

A common post Civil War theme, once the government refocused its efforts on Indian policy, was reform. Two significant events in Indian relations that came out of this period shaped Grant's Indian policies in the years to come. First, in 1869 came the Condition of Indian

Tribes Report. In 1865, Congress formed a special committee to examine the state of the Indian tribes and to make recommendations on Indian policy. Wisconsin Democrat turned Republican, Senator James Doolittle, produced the subsequent report in January 1867. It pointed out many of the failings of earlier actions which hampered Indian-white relations.²⁰ The Doolittle Report stated, “the committee are of the opinion that in a large majority of cases Indian wars are to be traced to the aggressions of lawless white men, always to be found on the frontier.... and it is difficult if not impossible to retain white men, especially white men upon the frontiers.”²¹ The report also pointed out many other contributing factors to problems, such as decay of hunting grounds on which the Plains Indians subsisted. One of the key factors causing this deterioration was the railroad lines stretching across the plains affecting buffalo ranges. There was also the absence of law and manpower to keep peace on the frontier, plus the corruptness and inefficiencies of the officials in charge of Indian affairs. The Committee defined the problem and recommended reform through boards of inspection on the Bureau of Indian Affairs to correct inefficiencies and corruption.²² Although the Committee identified many of the problems, nothing really changed except to correct inefficiencies. The Committee felt enforcement of federal law was essential, but did not offer a solution on how to accomplish this.²³

The second major post Civil War reform was the creation of the Indian Peace Commission. In 1867, “Congress passed an act to establish peace with certain hostile Indian Tribes” and established a commission of civilian officials and Army officers. The Peace Commission’s purpose was to meet with the chiefs of the tribes waging war, determine their grievances, and then make peace treaties. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Nathaniel G. Taylor headed the commission and had at his side notable figures such as Major General William T. Sherman. Unfortunately, the Peace Commission did not develop any new answers. The policy

of separating the two peoples via the reservation was still the primary answer. The Peace Commission did emphasize one key point: The challenges faced in undoing the previous injustices against the Indians that would not soon be forgotten. Its report of 1868 vividly portrays the problems the country faced with the Plains Indians.

In making treaties it was enjoined on us to remove, if possible, the causes of complaint on the part of the Indians. This would be no easy task. We have done the best we could under the circumstances, but it is now rather late in the day to think of obliterating from the minds of the present generation the remembrance of wrong. Among civilized men war usually springs from a sense of injustice. The best possible way then to avoid war is to do not act of injustice. When we learn that the same rule holds good with Indians, the chief difficulty is removed. But, it is said our wars with them have been almost constant. Have we been uniformly unjust? We answer, unhesitatingly, yes! We are aware that the masses of our people felt kindly towards them, and the legislation of Congress has always been conceived in the best intentions, but it has been erroneous in fact or perverted in execution. Nobody pays attention to Indian matters. This is a deplorable fact. Members of Congress understand the negro question, and talk learnedly of finance, and other problems of political economy, but when the progress of settlement reaches the Indian's home, the only question considered is, "how best to get his lands." When they are obtained the Indian is lost sight of. While our missionary societies and benevolent associations have annually collected thousands of dollars from the charitable, to be sent to Asia and Africa for purposes of civilization, scarcely a dollar is expended or a thought bestowed on the civilization of Indians at our very doors. Is it because our people who have grown rich in the occupation of their former lands-too often taken by force or procured in fraud-will not contribute?²⁴

There is no doubt about the feelings of injustice toward the Indians felt by Taylor and his fellow Commissioners. The Peace Commission identified the grievances of the tribes and negotiated two major treaties. First, the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge, established reservations for the Kiowa, Comanche, Apache, Cheyenne, and Arapaho. However, it also placed neighboring tribes adjacent to each other competing for limited resources. Next, the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie established peace with the Sioux and Arapaho and reserved the land west of the Missouri River and east of the Rockies for the Sioux. This treaty also gave the Sioux control of the Bozeman Trail (Appendix E) and banned white settlements and military posts in the region. The Fort Laramie Treaty thus gave the Sioux what they wanted, but it would also create a major

dilemma for President Grant in the years to come: It would not have the proper backing from the government to uphold its end of the provisions.²⁵ Ironically, the terms of treaty would eventually result in Grant's peace policy becoming a war with the Sioux. These were the problems President Grant faced when he assumed office in the spring of 1869. The concentrations of the Indians on respective reservations soon became the bedrock of Grant's Peace policy.²⁶

President Grant's Peace Policies

When President Grant assumed office, it was in an era of reform concerning Indian-white relations. The atrocities of the Sand Creek Massacre in 1864 and the Fetterman Massacre in 1866 gained much of the public's attention via newspaper reporters and the evolving print media. The events in the west could no longer be ignored. President Grant stood on the platform of promoting peace with the Indians (later known as "Grant's Peace Policy") and the newly inaugurated president sought to implement Taylor's Peace Commission ideas. These were not necessarily innovative, for they were rooted in past ones of separation, civilization, and Christianization. The only difference was the policies were to be executed with humanity and kindness and not force, thus "conquest through kindness." Another major goal for Grant was to handle the Indian problem more efficiently and without the corruption of the past.

In President Grant's first inaugural address in March of 1869 he stated, "The proper treatment of the original occupants of the land, the Indian, is one deserving of a careful study. I will favor any cause towards them that tends to favor their civilization, Christianization and ultimate citizenship."²⁷ President Grant firmly believed that "unscrupulous whites" were the primary cause of the Indian problems on the Great Plains. The first item on his agenda when he

took office was to appoint Ely S. Parker, a Seneca Indian, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Parker had been one of Grant's staff officers and right hand man after the Civil War. Along with appointing Parker, Grant also decided to assign only ordained ministers and Quakers as Indian agents. Grant believed these men would be the key to promoting the Christianization of the tribes and inspire the Indians to give up their nomadic ways of life through peaceful means and establish themselves on the reservations.²⁸

In the months prior to Grant's Inauguration, the struggle over Indian policy authority was intensifying and Nathaniel Taylor, who headed the peace commission, narrowly fended off the advocates who were lobbying for the return of the Indian Bureau to the War Department. He was able to accomplish this because President Grant did not believe he had the congressional support to make such a change. Taylor advocated creating an entirely new department independent of both the War Department and the Department of Interior, but Grant was not willing to go that far either, instead he created a Board of Indian Commissioners within the Department of Interior. The Board was an unpaid group of philanthropists appointed to assist and make recommendations to the Secretary of Interior on Indian affairs. However, it did little to solve the problem of how the War Department and Department of Interior were to accomplish the peaceful movement of non-compliant Indians to the defined reservations or the use of force as last resort when negotiations failed.²⁹

Grant's feelings toward the Indians and their well-being were genuine and he truly sought to achieve a peaceful solution, but prior to his presidency he dedicated very little time to contemplating the so-called Indian problem.³⁰ Between 1861 and 1865, the Civil War consumed all of Grant's energies, while in his post Civil War years, as the General in Chief of the Army, reconstruction efforts in the south dominated his time. Grant trusted his friend General William

T. Sherman's decisions on the Indian problems out west. Unfortunately, Sherman had little patience for the tribes and did not believe in leniency towards them.³¹ Grant also had Ely Parker at his side to handle Indian matters during this time, thus he put little effort towards it. Once Grant was in office he was forced to deal with the problem and he did so by committing to the peace policy slogan. However, he did so without a deep understanding of what it would take to achieve peace. Grant believed the reservation system would work with the help of the Quakers, but in actuality only 18 Quakers were appointed while 68 Army officers made up the difference as superintendents and agents.³² This is one area where Grant failed to separate his military background from his policy decisions. Despite this, Christianization was one of the hallmarks of Grant's policy.

Peace through kindness and justice was another major policy reform Grant sought. The devastating injustices toward the Indians could not continue if peace was going to be achieved. Unfortunately, implementing the policy turned out to be much more difficult in practice than originally understood. It was more than just rhetoric, particularly with the Christian agents, and to some degree even with those in the Army. Many of them truly believed in the peace policy, strived to achieve this goal, and used all means possible to meet policy objectives without using force. However, a major problem appeared in achieving these ends: The underlying reservation and civilization goal. In order to accomplish the objectives the Indians would have to agree to a cultural change in their way of life, become a civilized society acculturated in the white man's ways, and reside on the reservations. The tribes in many cases sought peace as well, but the agreement to confinement on reservations and changing from a hunter gather nomadic way of life to an agrarian civilized society was a cultural transition the Plains Indians would not embrace.³³ Movement to the reservation through kindness and peaceful means with the

implications therein were mutually incompatible objectives; this would require the tribes to want to move and change, which obviously they did not.

Columbus Delano, Grant's Secretary of Interior, summarized, Grant's peace policy in a statement in 1873. Delano explained first, the policy "aimed to place Indians on the reservations" where they would be separated from white settlements and could be civilized through Christian organizations. Second, it would punish the Indians severely for their outrages in order to teach them that cooperation with the government would be better than continuing their barbaric ways. Third, the administration was determined to see that supplies given to the Indians were of good quality and fairly priced in order to prevent corruption. Fourth, through the assistance of religious organizations, it aimed to procure "competent, upright, faithful, moral, and religious" agents to be the instruments of uplifting the Indians into a civilized society.³⁴ What stands apart from the others is the second goal, which is far from a characterization of peace. Also inherent is another key point: the assumed support of the "changed" way of life. The Northern Plains Indians had a much different culture than many of the eastern tribes the government had previously dealt with and they had little desire to abandon their hunter-gatherer lifestyle for a more sedentary agrarian lifestyle the government was offering

The end of treaty making is another important aspect of Indian relations during the Grant Administration. Similar to the outcry for peace and policy reform, considerable pressure existed for reform of the government relationship with the tribes. Treating the Indians as sovereign nations was no longer deemed a useful policy. The Indians did not have an enforceable system of government, therefore the terms of treaties were rarely abided by them (and in reality, by the government). President Grant, those within his administration, and the Christian reformers all wanted to do away with the old treaty system. Prominent figures in Indian relations, such as

Bishop Henry Whipple (Episcopal Bishop and long time advocate of Indian policy reform), Felix Brunot (Board of Commissioners member and well-known philanthropist), and Ely Parker all agreed the treaty system should be abolished. Whipple wrote in the *North American Review* in 1864,

Our first dealings with these savages is one of those blunders which is worse than a crime. We recognize a wandering tribe as an independent and sovereign nation. We send ambassadors to make a treaty as with our equals, knowing that every provision of that treaty will be our own, that those with whom we make it cannot compel us to observe it, that they are to live within our territory, yet not subject to our laws, that they have no government of their own, and are to receive none from us; in a word, we treat as an independent nation a people whom we will not permit to exercise one single element of that sovereign power which is necessary to a nation's existence.³⁵

The treaty system with the tribes was finally abolished in 1871, the status of the Indians as independent nations ended, and their status was redefined to wards of the federal government.³⁶

All of this well-intentioned policy and reform was ultimately unsuccessful. By the end of Grant's Presidency, the Board of Indian Commissioners and its philanthropic hopes of reform had failed; they were also unable to execute any joint collaboration with the Department of Interior. In 1874, the board resigned en masse, to be replaced by a new group of advisors.³⁷ Ely Parker and his replacement, Jacob Cox and others, left the Bureau of Indian Affairs office amidst scandal and corruption. The Christian organizations infused into the Indian agencies were caught up in quarreling for equal control over territory and complained of unequal distribution between the different religious organizations. The Catholics felt discriminated against because the Protestants overwhelmingly dominated the reform movement. Protestants and Catholics alike failed to recognize liberty of conscience for the Indians, i.e., freedom to choose their own Indian religion. Hence, they in turn began fighting amongst themselves. Most importantly, peace with the Plains Indians was not achieved. The result became the opposite of the arranged means from peace to war in 1876.³⁸

Despite his failures to achieve peace, Grant's policies did endure for years after his presidency. This is particularly true of the Christian element and the Board of Commissioners.³⁹ Unfortunately, Grant's "peace policy" failed to address the heart of the problem: The Plains Indian culture and way of life. The Plains Indians were not ready for rapid change and their cultural ways did not fit into the reservation system no matter how peacefully the government tried to establish it. The Army was left dealing with a culture which despised the white civilized way of life, the very way of life the policies were aimed at teaching and providing. Even the Indians, who may have resorted to the reservation at one time or another, were not satisfied with the reality of the reservation life; it simply was not in their cultural makeup.⁴⁰ The Northern Plains Indians way of life was incompatible with the settled and developing life of the dominant white incomers from the east.

The Military as the Instrument of Policy

Just as Clausewitz explains in book one of *On War*, "all wars can be considered acts of policy." The Indian wars west of the Mississippi from 1869 to 1876 were no exception. The stated policy means was via peace, but confinement to the reservation (i.e. separation and change) was the ultimate policy goal desired. Rather than a peaceful process, Grant's Indian policies resulted in war. The Indian Peace Commission and Nathaniel Taylor made every effort to separate the military from the execution of Indian Policy, but when peace failed and the clash of peoples resulted in conflicts the military and civilian proponents for peace had to resort to force to achieve the ultimate goal. Deep rooted in Indian policy was the use of the U.S. Army. The Army's official role was changing throughout the 19th century, and during the Grant Administration it was an ambiguous one at best. Grant's Peace Policy put the military forces on the frontier in a situation with which many Army officers did not concur with and felt they could

not achieve peacefully. Thus, when the Peace policy failed with those who refused to change and became hostile, moving all of them to reservations became a task for the military on the frontier.⁴¹ In this process, the Army could ameliorate the situation between the mutually incompatible white settlers and the Indians. The Army thus often became an amelioration force to achieve the desired goal, as opposed to what might have happened if the settlers and Indians had been left to resolve the problems themselves. Ironically, during the time of Grant's "Peace Policy" the Army engaged in the bitterest battles of all the Indian Wars.

One of the major problems Grant faced was controlling dissention between the Bureau of Indian Affairs and War Department. This was particularly true with regard to the Plains Indians. The Indian Bureau complained that the Army's pursuit of the hostile plains bands was undermining peaceful relations, while the Army believed severe penalty for raids would provide the example that residing on the reservation was the better choice.⁴² Grant may have favored War Department control, but compromised with the Board of Commissioners and the Christian agents because he knew Congress would support it.⁴³ Commissioner Ely Parker believed, however, that there was a clear understanding of the roles. In his Commissioner of Indian Affairs report of 1869, Parker addressed the government policy in terms of responsibility of enforcement. He wrote,

That they [the Indians] should be secured their legal rights; located where practicable, upon reservations; assisted in agricultural pursuits and the arts of civilized life; and that Indians who should fail or refuse to come in and locate in permanent abodes provided for them, would be subject wholly to the control and supervision of military authorities, to be treated as friendly or hostile as circumstances might justify. The War Department concurring, issued orders upon the subject for the information and guidance of the proper military officers and the result has been harmony of action between the two departments, no conflict of opinion having arisen as to the duty, power and responsibility of either.⁴⁴

Parker's optimistic evaluation was echoed by his successor, Francis A. Walker. The new Commissioner believed no problem existed in using soldiers to control the Indians **off** the

reservations, while simultaneously Indian agents were charged with maintaining peace **on** the reservations. The implications when the Indians left the reservations to hunt for game or because they refused to reside in the defined area resulted in the Army using force as necessary to accomplish the policy goal. Regardless of who was responsible or in control of administering Indian peace policy, the overall approach of confining Indians to the reservation provoked war. When this occurred, the Army had to use force to achieve “peace policy” objectives.⁴⁵

The Army’s role during the Grant administration thus became one of frontier constabulary police and a fighting force. It was there to seek out the bad “hostile Indians,” and force them to the reservation. The Army also became responsible for protecting the white settlers. As Commissioner Francis Walker stated, “the Army’s role was for discipline, not war.” In other words, Indians residing off the reservation required disciplinary action to move them onto the reservations via force if necessary. Grant and the Commissioners idealistic views concerning the use of the Army failed to examine the Plains Indians reaction to the Army’s use of force. The Indians reaction became one of unconventional warfare, comprised of stealth, ambush, and retreat. They were highly skilled at this form of war and were able to decoy, deceive, and surprise their enemies. General Nelson A. Miles, a prominent frontier officer, respected his foe and wrote, “They (the Indians) had courage, skill, sagacity, endurance, fortitude, and self-sacrifice of a high order.”⁴⁶ These continual small raids and engagements on both sides over the first few years of Grant’s Administration threatened the peace policy’s widespread support. For example, the Army became increasingly outspoken against the idealistic views and corruption of the Indian Bureau. General Phillip Sheridan once remarked, “If a white man commits murder or robs, we hang him or send him to the penitentiary; if an Indian does the same, we have been in the habit of giving him more blankets.”⁴⁷

The Army officers on the frontier became increasingly frustrated with their inability to locate and remove Indians not residing on the defined reservations. They were also dissatisfied with the Indian Bureau's Agents and their ability to control the movement of Indians on and off the reservations. This freedom of movement created a place for the hostile Indians to harbor, especially in the winter months, which created continual frustration for the Army. Many of the Army officers believed the Indian agents were afraid the Indians, therefore they would not attempt to force them to stay on the reservations.⁴⁸ Sheridan's comments were clearly out of frustration, but ultimately he understood the underlying issues of a policy and a system which were mutually incompatible. General William T. Sherman's comments to Sheridan's successor of the Department of the Missouri, General John Schofield, summed up the Army's frustrations: "The whole Indian question is such a snarl, that I am utterly powerless, to help you by order or advice, do the best you can."⁴⁹ General Sherman understood the problem as a clash of cultures and for this reason supported the reservation policy; he also knew this could not be done peacefully. As he told Sheridan in 1868, "Sooner or later, these Sioux will have to be wiped out or made to just stay where they are put."⁵⁰

The military life on the frontier during the peace policy years was a treacherous one. History often highlights the great battles such as, Custer's Last Stand at the Battle of Little Bighorn where Custer met his fate and Chief Joseph and the Nez Percés' retreat to near the Canadian border. However, large engagements were not characteristic of the Indian Wars on the Great Plains. The Army, in actuality, had insufficient numbers very thinly spread over an expansive western frontier in a system of tiny outposts and forts (see Wooster's *The American Military Frontiers* Chapter 10). Life from these installations was most often characterized by unsuccessful reconnaissance over hostile terrain, many times in treacherous conditions. The

Army was plagued by logistical problems to supply these outposts, especially those far from rivers or railroads, this made for a difficult life on the frontier.⁵¹ The inadequate support in order to achieve their mission of policing the hostile Indians led the Army to a tactic of surprise attacks on Indian villages. These attacks were similar to those the Indians had been conducting against each other for years and on the white settlers since their intrusion into Indian Territory. The idea was to deplete the Indians logistical supply to the point they would be forced to the reservation to survive.⁵² However, until the railroad and road network on the frontier was more robust, the Army's ability to sustain a long-term campaign was limited and it often had to return to logistical bases to resupply. The result was the Army's continued frustration due to limited contact with the enemy on the vast frontier.⁵³

Another inadequacy of the peace policy was empowering the Army to determine hostile and friendly Indians without giving guidance or definition to those terms. This resulted in the misinterpretation and destruction of Indian Villages and the killing of women, children, and elders. Where and when this occurred, the forceful aspect of the peace policy hindered achieving its goals and resulted in a black mark on the Army for its perceived immoral actions.⁵⁴ One notable instance was Custer's advance on Chief Black Kettle's Cheyenne camp on the Washita River in 1868. Chief Black Kettle was a known peaceful Chief, but Custer's unprovoked attack resulted in many casualties, more than 900 Indian horses destroyed, and the Indian village set ablaze.⁵⁵ The Frontier Army never learned to distinguish between hostile and friendly Indians; in actuality, even if those terms were defined many groups of the Plains Indians were not unmistakably one or the other. On June 29, 1869, only months after President Grant assumed office, General Sheridan, under the direction of General Sherman, provided clarity for the men under his charge on the plains. General Sheridan's general order stated, "all Indians, when on

their proper reservations, are under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of their agents...Outside the well-defined limits of their reservations they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority, and as a rule will be considered hostile.” This was Sherman and Sheridan’s way of simplifying a complex issue for the men in blue on the frontier. Unfortunately, where the Sioux were free to roam and hunt in the unceded land was not well explained and quite contradictory to the Fort Laramie Treaty in 1868.⁵⁶ For the Army all this would come to a culmination point in 1876, after many distinguishable terms of the treaty had long been broken. At the Battle of Little Bighorn, the Sioux’s greatest tactical victory produced the seedbed of their ultimate (and very quick) defeat.⁵⁷ Grant’s use of the Army as an instrument of his peace policy thus became a great failure. The Army’s attempt to police the hostile Indians only enhanced hostilities between the two peoples.

Unfortunately, the Army has often received the blame for the destruction of the Indian way of life. A closer examination reveals the real reason for what occurred: The uncontrolled westward migration of white settlers with the attendant development spearheaded by the railroads and incoming populations that sapped the land of the tribe’s basic source of life, the buffalo. The land was carved up for individual ownership. The settlers were the catalyst to the government involvement. The conscious goal of both military and civilian authorities to change the Indians way of life, “*their culture*,” is where the brunt of the blame should lie. The nomadic way of life the Northern Plains tribes was incompatible with the developed settlement life of the new white incomers. Separation was deemed necessary, but the ultimate solution would take cultural change by the Indians and cultural change does not happen quickly. The Sioux and the Crow Indians, two of the Northern Plains Nations, handled white encroachment much different, but the end state for both turned out the same.

The Crow Nation

The Crow Indians met treachery and lost of their way of life just as all the other Plains Indians, but they did so without resistance. The Crow Nation never waged war against the whites and were known for keeping their treaties with the government. Likewise, they were known not to break peace agreements with neighboring enemy tribes either. The Crow's cooperation with the government and military was evident throughout the 19th century and was particularly prevalent in their employment as Army Indian scouts during the Grant administration.

There are many contributing factors to the Crows trustworthy characteristics. The first and primary reason for the Crow's willingness to work with the government resulted from the small size of their tribe. The Crow Nation was approximately 4,000 strong, and thus considerably smaller than two of its primary enemies: the Blackfeet to the north (15,000) and the Sioux to the east (25,000).⁵⁸ Constantly warring with these tribes over hunting territory and horses led the Crow to take advantage of treating with the U. S. government in hopes for protection. The Crow signed the Friendship Treaty of 1825, when General Henry Atkinson and Indian Agent Benjamin O'Fallon were on expedition to make peace with the Missouri River Tribes.⁵⁹ The Crow then signed the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 and the second Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 (Appendix D and E). The 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty significantly reduced the size of Crow territory, but with the Sioux constantly encroaching from the east the tribe had few options. Nonetheless, they hoped for whatever protection they could gain from the government.

Another reason existed for the Crow to uphold their part in treaties and peace agreements: their internal system of government. The only way to become a chief was by counting coup.

The warrior with the most coups had the highest rank. The Crow lived in camps of various sizes and there was a government and family clan system within the camps. The highest-ranking chief would be the Camp Chief and this system held true regardless of multiple clans or when multiple camps joined into one.⁶⁰ The Crow system of determining chiefs was simple: the most successful warriors were the leaders. Successfully counting coups or winning prestige in battle determined the leaders. Coups could be achieved in many ways and some gained more credit than others did. Examples of coups would be touching the enemy with a hand, bow, or coup stick in battle without being harmed, acquiring horses tied up at enemy camps, and being the first to touch a fallen enemy (regardless of who actually killed him). Counting coup was an act of bravery and it was required to be done in the face of danger.

This system was simple, but it worked. Rarely did the Crow ever have uprisings within their own, yet they still maintained highly individualistic attitudes where any member could rise to power. The Crow's promoted individual freedoms, but all actions had to be for the good of the tribe. For these reasons the Crow did not break their promises. The Crow's allegiance to their chiefs and adherence to their system was different from many of the other tribes where the chiefs had little control over the young braves. The basic requirement of Crow system was actions against enemy tribes. The Crows' enemies were the Blackfeet, Sioux, Arapaho, Assiniboine, Gros Ventre, Ute, and Cheyenne. Even though the Crow were amicable to the treaties for assignment of territory, they failed to realize that the reservation system would eventually prevent conflict and the associated counting coups. Without this, their system of defining success broke down.⁶¹

Besides their stricter adherence to their tribal leaders, the Crow also set themselves apart from other Plains Indians in their conduct of war. There is no doubt the Crow were a warrior

based and semi-nomadic culture, but they differed significantly from others tribes such as the Sioux and Cheyenne: They did not kill or mutilate captured members of enemy tribes. Counting coup was for adventure, prestige, and gaining wealth for the tribe via conflict, but killing was not coveted. The Crow would adopt captured women and children into their own tribes to build the strength and workforce of the tribe. The adopted members rarely tried to escape to return to their original tribes. A contributing factor to the adopted members wanting to stay may have been that comparatively life was better with the Crow. The Crow territory was abundant with grassy plains for buffalo and raising horses, it encompassed mountainous terrain for trapping and fur trading, and many rivers and streams ideal for small game. This was another reason the Crow were happy to sign treaties to maintain their paradise that would soon be sought after by neighboring tribes as the buffalo numbers dwindled and settlers pushed west.⁶²

The Crow Indians not only signed treaties with the government, but also worked directly for the Army as scouts during the Grant Administration and others succeeding it. One of the many challenges for the Army on the frontier was locating bands of hostile Indians. The primary way of locating hostile bands was through patrols, but with limited manpower, knowledge, and experience in the operational area it gave the Indian foes a distinct advantage. Rarely did the Army personnel on the frontier have the training and familiarity with the land required at best, this might be obtained through on the job experience. One remedy to help assist frontier units in the tracking and location of hostile Indians was the use of Indian scouts. In 1866, the War Department obtained approval from Congress to employ 1,000 Indian Scouts as part of the regular Army. These scouts became highly valuable assets and were usually loyal members of the units assigned. The scouts enhanced the forces with whom they operated via tracking skills and serving as guides.⁶³

General George Crook, another prominent frontier officer, was the primary proponent of using Indian scouts and he did so usually with great success. Crook understood various Indian cultures and their sense of individuality, and he instructed his men not to impose the Army culture and discipline on the scouts. The Indians “wildness” was what made them successful scouts and Crook had no intention of militarizing them. Crook instructed his men to form bonds with the Indian scouts and treat them as equals.⁶⁴ All of this became a key element to success.

The Crow Indians were a perfect fit for Army scouts in the Northern Plains. The Crow had engaged in friendly arrangements with the military since 1825, and when Army’s primary fight ensued against their bitter enemy the Sioux, the Crows signed on. However, Crook had one major setback but the Crows saved him: He narrowly averted disaster at the Battle of Rosebud Creek in June 1876 primarily due to the ferocious fighting skills and actions of 262 Crow and Shoshone Scouts he had with him. Nine Days later, General George Armstrong Custer would not be as fortunate as he met some of the same Sioux and Cheyenne (and others) only now they were in far greater numbers. Custer, like Crook, also employed Crow Scouts but Custer chose to ignore their warnings and felt the urge to rush into battle before surveying the entire scene.⁶⁵ Custer chose to take the initiative so as to prevent the Indians from scattering to the hills. Unfortunately, Custer approached the largest concentration of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors known to date and lost his life (along with one third of his command) in the most famous battle of the Indian Wars at the Little Bighorn.⁶⁶ Another well-known instance with Crow Scouts occurred during Chief Joseph’s famous march with the Nez Pierce. The Nez Pierce planned on aligning with the Crow once they crossed the continental divide into the Northern Great Plains after they were driven out of their homeland. Once the Nez Pierce discovered the Crow scouts with the Army east of the divide their hopes were dashed. Nonetheless, they continued their

plight to the north but were unable to successfully escape to the Canadian border for they were stopped forty miles shy in the Bear Paw Mountains of Northern Montana.⁶⁷

Ultimately, the Crow Indians did lose their way of life on the plains despite their attempt at cooperation with the government. The last true chief was Chief Plenty Coups who died in 1932. Plenty Coups' name is quite ironic, as he was the last living Crow Indian to have any opportunity to engage in the custom of Counting Coup, the sole requirement to become a chief.⁶⁸ Today, the Crow Nation lives on the largest reservation in Montana and the fifth largest in the country, encompassing approximately 2.3 million acres south of Billings. The Crow now have a system of government with three branches and elected officials, modeled after that of the United States. The Crow adopted their most recent constitution in 2002.⁶⁹

The Sioux Nation

The Sioux are probably the most written about tribe in American History. The Sioux Nation was the largest of the Plains Indians and was comprised of three separate divisions: The Teton, Santee, and Yankton, or the western, eastern, and middle divisions respectively. Each of these divisions was divided further into separate named bands, but for the purposes of this study they all are addressed as the Sioux. For further clarification, the Grant Administration's dealings with the Sioux primarily concerned the Teton Sioux, which had seven bands: Brule, Oglala, Hunkpapa, Miniconjou, Sans Arcs, Oohenonpa, and Sihasapa. The Sioux also had a long history of hostility towards other tribes particularly, the Chippewa to their north.⁷⁰

The Sioux were similar to the other Plains Indians in that they were a nomadic hunter-gatherer society. Being a society that lived off the land by roaming for game, the settlers migration west would produce tensions and conflict. Hostilities with the White man and the

Army had ebbed and flowed since the Lewis and Clark Expedition into the Louisiana Purchase Territory, but the first official Sioux War occurred 1854. The Army and the Sioux then continued to clash throughout the rest of the century until it finally tragedy at Wounded Knee in December 1890.

Their dealings with the United States Government during the Grant Administration and just prior to it were complex and showed all the signs of coercive efforts by the U.S. Government. The Sioux and the Grant Administration's relationship reveals an interesting chain of events that actually started just prior to Grant taking office with the end of Red Cloud's War in 1868 and the Peace Commission's work that resulted in the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie. Red Cloud, who was an Oglala Sioux Chief, waged war against the Army in 1866 over the Bozeman Trail (Appendix F), a new emigrant trail from the upper Platte River to the gold mines near Virginia City, Montana. The Bozeman Trail cut right through the prime hunting grounds of the Sioux. The culmination of the conflict was the Fetterman Massacre on December 21, 1866. Captain William Fetterman had boasted he could take his troops and ride through the whole Sioux nation. He later commanded 80 troops in a relief party to assist a wood cutting detail just outside of Fort Phil Kearny that was being attacked by Sioux warriors. The Sioux used a classic decoy tactic and drew Fetterman and his 80 men into an ambush launched by approximately 1500 warriors.⁷¹

Red Cloud's war sparked Congress to form the 1868 Indian Peace Commission. This Commission was under immense pressure from Congress and President Andrew Johnson, who appointed it, to conclude peaceful solution with the hostile tribes.⁷² General Sherman and General Alfred H. Terry, two of the military members of the commission, favored retaliation to right the wrongs of the Fetterman Massacre. Sherman and Terry believed this would prove to

the Sioux that confinement to the reservation was their best option.⁷³ Nathaniel Taylor, head of the commission, believed they needed to create a more just and humane reservation governed by more liberal policies.⁷⁴ The result of the commission was the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty.

Sherman and his subordinate commanders were not in full concurrence with the Fort Laramie Treaty, but Taylor was confident extensive government provisions would entice the Sioux to stay on the reservation. The separate articles of the treaty included confusing and unclear terms and wording. This was true even to someone who had full understanding of the language let alone a translation for the Indians. The most confusing verbiage was Article 16 with respect to the use of unceded Indian Territory.⁷⁵ The compilation of the Sioux signatures was also not gained at one time as with many of the other treaties. It is safe to say the Sioux chiefs who signed, whether through language barrier or confusing terms, did not have a full understanding of the Treaty and its implications.⁷⁶ The Sioux believed Article 16 gave them full and unrestricted use of the territory it described, but Article 11 contradicted Article 16 and required confinement to a smaller reservation as defined in Article 2.

Treaty with the Sioux 1868, Article 2

The United States agrees that the following district of country, to wit, viz: commencing on the east bank of the Missouri River where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude crosses the same, thence along low-water mark down said east bank to a point opposite where the northern line of the State of Nebraska strikes the river, thence west across said river, and along the northern line of Nebraska to the one hundred and fourth degree of longitude west from Greenwich, thence north on said meridian to a point where the forty-sixth parallel of north latitude intercepts the same, thence due east along said parallel to the place of beginning; and in addition thereto, all existing reservations on the east bank of said river shall be, and the same is, set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein named...⁷⁷

Treaty with the Sioux 1868, Article 11

In consideration of the advantages and benefits conferred by this and the many pledges of friendship by the United States, the tribes who are parties to this agreement hereby

stipulate that they will relinquish all right to occupy permanently the territory outside their reservations as herein defined....⁷⁸

Treaty with the Sioux 1868, Article 16

The United States hereby agrees and stipulates that the country of the North Platte River and east of the summits of the Bighorn Mountains shall be held and considered to be unceded Indian Territory, and also stipulates and agrees that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same.⁷⁹

The fact that the Bozeman Trail was to be abandoned and the forts along it would be closed was a key point for the Sioux, particularly Red Cloud. Since the trail was now of little importance to the government with the coming completion of the transcontinental railroad, this was an easy concession.⁸⁰ All of this occurred only months before Grant assumed office. Despite looking promising on paper, the enforcement of the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty would be a difficult task.

From 1868 to 1875, problems with the Sioux continued despite the Fort Laramie Treaty although both sides attempted peace and showed restraint at first. The dilemma for Grant really began with continued white expansion into Sioux Indian territory. In 1871, the government itself approved a survey expedition into Sioux territory for continuation of the Northern Pacific Railroad. The surveyors, escorted by the Army, encountered raids by hostile Sioux warriors led by Sitting Bull, a Hunkpapa Sioux representative. Despite failed attempts to maintain peace and get permission from Sitting Bull for the railroad work, hostilities rose. Three years later in 1874, General Custer and his 7th Cavalry led an expedition on a reconnaissance into the Black Hills, “to obtain the most information in regard to the character of the country and the possible routes of communication through it.” Surprisingly, Custer’s journey encountered no resistance but the Sioux were enraged due to the direct violation of the 1868 Treaty. On this expedition, two tag along gold prospectors discovered gold and the ramifications that would ensue created a major dilemma for President Grant.⁸¹ The discovery of gold in the Black Hills led to an uncontrollable

flow of whites into them and Grant was forced to either restrict the settlers or attempt to acquire the area from the Sioux. In reality, neither was possible.

Despite the encroachment in the Black Hills and further incursions with probing expeditions in 1875 for new forts down the Yellowstone River by Lieutenant Colonel James Forsyth and President Grant's son Lieutenant Fred D. Grant, little conflict with the Sioux occurred throughout that year. Although 1875 was relatively quiet on the Northern Plains, President Grant's acclaimed "peace policy" was about to dissolve into war. Challenged with controlling expansion and Indian hostilities, he started to fall back on his military past. First, he replaced the Secretary of Interior with the pro military Zachariah Chandler. This started a chain of events that would lead to an ultimatum for the Sioux to bring their roaming tribes to the defined reservation by January 31, 1876 or be militarily moved there.⁸² The Sioux had multiple bands off their reservation camped in winter lodges in the Powder River country (located in the earlier mentioned unceded Indian territory) and would not have been able to move to their reservation even if they desired to. The reservation territory was to the east in South Dakota and movement in the winter months on the Northern Plains was not possible. Sitting Bull, the Hunkpapa Sioux leader, had also vowed never to go to the reservation and was quoted saying, "I do not wish to be shut up in a coral. It is bad for young men to be fed by an agent. It makes them lazy and drunken. All agency [reservation] Indians I have seen are worthless. They are neither red warriors or farmers."⁸³ Not surprisingly, the Sioux could and would not comply, hence three phases of a campaign occurred against the Sioux, the second of which culminated at the Battle of Little Bighorn on June 26, 1876. Politically, Grant held on to his peace policy and let his Department of Interior and War Department lead the nation to believe there was no other choice with respect to the Sioux on the Northern Plains. However, what was not widely known

or comprehended was the lack of hostility of the Sioux in 1875 and the government's total disregard for the Fort Laramie Treaty. Still, apprehension existed for any change of policy. A November 1, 1875 dispatch from Washington appeared in the *New York Herald* about the growing suspicion of the government's abandonment of the Peace Policy:

Several pastors in this city of different denominations, who were apprehensive that the government was about to abandon its peace policy toward the Indians, called upon the President to express their conviction that such a course would greatly disappoint Christian people...The President replied with great promptness and precision that he did not regard the peace policy as a failure, and that it would not only not be abandoned while he occupied that place, but that it was his hope that during his administration it would become so firmly established as to be the necessary policy of his successors.⁸⁴

Grant's handling of the Sioux problem in retrospect seems atrocious and there is no doubt he could have handled it differently. In Grant's defense, the poorly written Fort Laramie Treaty, the Peace Commission, and his own War Department generals, specifically Sherman and Sheridan, put him in a very difficult position. Grant relied on his military instincts, sided with his trusted military officers on the frontier, and chose war to enforce the perceived interpretation of the Treaty. Grant's position should not have been a surprise, as Robert Utley points out in *The Indian Frontier*: The President often followed up his peace policy proclamations with a warning that went generally unheard, "Those who do not accept this policy will find the new administration ready for a sharp and severe war policy."⁸⁵

The campaigns of 1876 commenced in March with General Sheridan's strategy of convergence against the "roamers," i.e., those off the reservation or, by definition, hostiles. General George Crook made first contact on the Powder River on March 17, but was set back by winter and lack of supplies. Crook then encountered the Sioux and Cheyenne on June 17 at the Battle of Rosebud; in the after action there, he claimed victory because the Indians withdrew. However, it was not a victory as his check there actually prevented his critical support from the

south to Sheridan's converging columns strategy of the 1876 campaign. The campaign plan had two other elements: General Alfred Terry was approaching from the east with Custer and the 7th Cavalry and Colonel John Gibbon approached from the west. The converging columns goal was to pin down the "roamers" in a decisive engagement, but a lack of communication between the columns and the expanse territory made it difficult to achieve such a coordinated attack. The campaign ended in disaster when Custer and his 7th Cavalry struck the large camp of Cheyenne and Sioux warriors on the Little Bighorn River without the support of Gibbon, Terry, or Crook.⁸⁶

After the summer ended, the Army set out to campaign again in the winter of 1876-77 and this time had more success with Colonel Ranald S. Mackenzie in November in the Bighorn Mountains and Colonel Nelson Miles winter operations in January 1877 on the Tongue River. On May 6, 1877 Crazy Horse and his Oglalas Sioux rode into the Red Cloud Agency and laid down their weapons. Crazy Horse died four months later in a scuffle when, in an attempt to arrest him for provoking trouble on the reservation, he was stabbed by either a soldier's bayonet or another Indian's knife. Sitting Bull, who refused to surrender, had fled to Canada with a small contingent of followers, where they struggled to survive due to shortages of food. Eventually, in July 1881, Sitting Bull and about 50 families appeared at Fort Buford, Montana, where he handed his rifle to his 8-year-old son and told him to give it to the Soldier. "I wish it to be remembered," he said, "that I was the last man of my tribe to surrender my rifle, and this day have given it to you."⁸⁷

The final tragedy for the Sioux occurred at Wounded Knee on December 29, 1890. Daniel F. Royer, the Indian Agent at Pine Creek, misunderstood the purposes for the Ghost Dance, a religious dance incited by Sioux Pilgrims who returned from Nevada with word of a new Messiah. The Indians at Pine Creek and other agencies began to leave their cabins to set up

tepees and dance. When Royer could not get the Indians to return to their homes and stop dancing, he feared a general uprising and called in the Army. The Army's arrival united the Sioux Ghost Dancers in support for freedom of their religion. The tragedy culminated when a group of Ghost Dancers was surrounded by Colonel James Forsyth's troops at Wounded Knee and, in an attempt to disarm an Indian, shots were fired. In the ensuing action, a massacre occurred in the Sioux Camp with at least 150 Indians dead including women and children. The Sioux did not intend the Ghost Dance as an act of aggression; instead, it was their attempt at divine salvation. Unfortunately, Agent Royer's fear and incompetence as an Indian agent caused the last tragedy of the Indian Wars.⁸⁸

The Sioux today have many separate tribal governments scattered across several reservations and communities in the United States and Canada. These are located in the Dakotas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Montana, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. The Pine Ridge Reservation and the Standing Rock Reservation, encompassing parts of North Dakota and South Dakota, are two of the largest Sioux Reservations. The Sioux on the reservations continue to struggle to maintain their culture. The bands of the tribe struggle with a myriad of issues: high suicide rates, extremely low life expectancy, poverty, disease, unemployment, and alcohol/drug addiction. Only 14% of the Sioux today speak their native language.⁸⁹

As recently 1974, a council of Sioux leaders at the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation called for a Declaration of Independence from the United States Government and an activist group called the Republic of Lakotah was later formed. The Republic of Lakotah has representation from the reservations in Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana. Its mission is for "the reestablishment of the freedom loving and freedom seeking Lakotah people."

On December 17, 2007, the Republic of Lakotah went to Washington DC and symbolically withdrew from the constitutionally mandated treaties to become a free and independent country. Their complicated legal battle for sovereignty and rights continues in the courts today.⁹⁰

Conclusion

The Grant Administration faced a monumental challenge with the clash of two cultures that brought conflict and disaster on the Northern Plains. The massacres and atrocities prior to the Grant Administration by both the Army and Indians, such as Sand Creek and Fetterman incidents, brought the problem that was previously out of sight and out of mind unless on the frontier to the point where it could not be ignored. The attention this gained helped produce an outcry for reform. Grant's attempt at this came in the way of a peace policy, for which the ground work had been laid by the Peace Commission of 1868. Grant adopted a Peace Policy linked to Christian reform in the way of newly appointed Christian agents. However, he also used the military as a backup force to quell raids against white settlers when peace could not be achieved and, if necessary, by force with arms to enforce treaty terms and policy goals. Unfortunately for all involved, reform and the peace policy were just a new facade built on the previous policies forged earlier in the century of essentially separation and change of life for the Indians. It was a shift from removal to the west to removal and separation of the two peoples onto reservations. Ideally, this could be peacefully.

The military men assigned as Indian agents, the civilian agents, and the Army regulars serving on the frontier faced numerous problems without adequate manpower or the proper government support for their mission. Life on the frontier could be an isolated and challenging existence, and those that served were courageous and hardy individuals. Many of the agents and

military commanders truly believed in the peace policy and worked endlessly to achieve it, while others sabotaged the process along the way. The Army served as an undermanned constabulary force attempting to separate whites and Indians, and in so doing sought to move and contain the indigenous peoples onto a reservation; if they left, they would be deemed hostile and force used to move them back onto it. All of this well-intentioned use of the Army attempted to achieve an unachievable goal.

The policy addressed the clash of two incompatible ways of life through separation and an attempt to change the Indians way of life to a more perceived civilized one. The policy did not address a base issue: what if the Indians did not want to change their way of life or did not want to go to a reservation? The 1868 Peace Commission understood the Northern Plains Indians grievances. Unfortunately, the country was rapidly expanding and the society moving west was born of a need for land and the government did not have the means or desire to stop them. Therefore, the government faced the challenge of a clash of two incompatible cultures. Thus, separation, assimilation, educating, and Christianizing the Indians became the answer to a basic problem: to force the tribes to abandon their hunter-gather ways. The Indians did not accept this change and the Army's role shifted from frontier constabulary operation to war campaign operations. Ironically, it required the use of force to achieve peace policy objectives.

Two Northern Plains tribes, the Crow, and Sioux, chose different paths. The Crow Nation, threatened on all fronts by government and other hostile tribes, chose to work with the government as an ally. The Sioux, on the other hand, were not going to change without a fight. Regardless, the end state was the same for both: they lost their traditional hunter-gatherer way of life. The days of that warrior lifestyle were over. The peace policy on the Northern Plains was not achievable because Grant and all who went before him failed to understand the Plains Indian

way of life could not be changed quickly. The leaders of the time did not closely examine the culture of the Indians. With the Plains Indians, it was believed they could be civilized and acculturated quickly and voluntarily into the white man's way of life via Christianity and education.


The 1868 Peace Commission, when tasked with finding out the grievances of the Indians, actually derived the correct but incompatible answers. The Indians wanted to be left to their ways of hunting and roaming the plains. They wanted the white man to stop destroying the buffalo ranges and stop encroaching into their territory. The Commission made its failed effort to address these issues with the Fort Laramie Treaty, but pressures from the advancing society from the east could not be stopped. With the Indian and white cultures there was such a division in beliefs that the two could simply not understand each other's ways nor could the two opposing ways of life co-exist on the Great Plains. The Plains Indian viewed the land as a "religion" not a possession. The whole idea of the reservation, land ownership, and farming were incomprehensible to them. The white man's settlement way of life was based on agriculture, ranching, and extraction from the land. Settlers moving west believed in Christian and opportunistic ways and they needed land to develop their lives. Grant and others believed the Indians could change quickly, but two Northern Plains tribes saw only two options: fight for their way of life or be confined and lose it. The Sioux and Cheyenne chose the former and Grant's peace policy turned into a bitter fight.

How does all this relate to the military professional of today? When the military is used as one of the instruments of national policy, military professionals absolutely must understand the culture of the peoples the government policies affect. Often when the military is used it goes forward with the mindset to achieve change with immediate results. But even with force and

limited time is this possible? Evolutionary change of a people's way of life takes significant time and this must be understood. Military professionals must also understand their own culture and that in which they operate in distant lands. Lastly, since military professionals don't make the policies but are one of the instruments of national power, they must be able to effectively communicate to their superiors when there is a cultural misunderstanding which can hinder the achievement of policy goals. Another factor is time, which in any commitment is not unlimited. Stated another way, the armed forces must comprehend what it can and cannot achieve and ensure political leaders and policy makers comprehend this.

APPENDIX A

1775 Post-Revolutionary Territory




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Proclamation_of_1763

In 1763, the British Crown established a proclamation outlining the territory west of the Appalachians as an Indian reserve. This line recognized a potential area of conflict with Euro-Americans and the tribes due to westward expansion. The Crown faced a considerable problem with the enforcement of the proclamation line and the U. S. Government inherited the problem in the post-Revolutionary era. This map graphically depicts the beginnings of the governments' removal policies.

APPENDIX B

Jackson's 1830's Indian Removal




http://wps.ablongman.com/long_divine_appap_7/0,9455,1518971-content,00.html

An illustration of President Jackson's removal of the eastern Indians to a newly designated Indian territory located in present day Oklahoma.

APPENDIX C

Territorial Expansion




TERRITORIAL EXPANSION BY THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

http://wps.ablongman.com/long_divine_appap_7/0,9455,1518971-content,00.html

This map depicts how the country expanded in such a short time from 1783 to 1850. It illustrates that nationalistic expansion was a primary goal of the country.

APPENDIX D

1851 Fort Laramie Treaty




http://www.ndstudies.org/resources/IndianStudies/threeaffiliated/images/laramie_large.gif

This map shows the territory of the plains tribes as per the terms of the 1851 Fort Laramie Treaty. It is interesting to note the dates of the active U.S. Army Forts inside the Indian territory.

APPENDIX E

1868 Fort Laramie Treaty



http://www.ndstudies.org/resources/IndianStudies/standingrock/historical_gs_reservation.html

A depiction of the boundaries set forth in the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty. The territory illustrated under Articles 2 (Great Sioux Reservation), 11, and 16 are key to the December 1875 mandate for the Indians to return to the reservation, as most winter roamers resided in the unceded territory of Articles 11 and 16 and had no intention of moving to the reservation.

APPENDIX F

Major Native American Battles in the West



NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE WEST: MAJOR BATTLES AND RESERVATIONS

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us Terr_1860.jpg

This map depicts the major Indian battles in the west. What is significant are the relatively few battles depicted. It highlights the vast frontier in which the majority of engagements were small in nature as the elusive Indian rarely ever fought in a pitched battle.

APPENDIX G

Well Known Northern Plains Tribes

Apsaroke known as the Crow Indians⁹¹

How the Crow Indians came to be known and settled in present day southern Montana is an interesting story that is still debated today. The most common belief is the Crow are descendants of the Hidatsa Indians of the eastern woodlands of upper Minnesota. Sometime in the early part of the 17th Century about 400 Indians separated from the sedentary Hidatsa tribe and followed their leader No Vitals in search of a promised land where a sacred tobacco plant grows. Making a clean cut from the Hidatsas, the Crows followed No Vitals and his successors all over the Northern Plains and Rocky Mountains. After approximately 100 years of traveling they found the sacred tobacco plant at the base of the Big Horn Mountains which became their heartland.

Once in their heartland the Crow became nomadic hunter gatherers subsiding on the buffalo. They lived in tepees and roamed the area from the Missouri River south to the Yellowstone River, in and about the Bighorn, Pryor, and Wolf Mountain ranges. The Crow were surrounded by their enemies: Blackfeet, Flathead, Sioux, Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Shoshone Indians.

Arapaho Indians⁹²

The Arapaho Tribe migrated into its homeland of Colorado and Wyoming from the northeast. Tribal history tells of a migration across a great frozen river to the north, which may have been the Missouri.

The Arapaho were nomadic buffalo hunters whose lifestyle corresponded closely to that of their traditional allies, primarily the Cheyenne, Sioux and Gros Ventre; and their traditional enemies, the Crow, Kiowa, and Comanche. They were part of the classic High Plains culture, living in tepees and hunting buffalo on horseback.

Blackfoot Indians⁹³

The Blackfeet Indians believe they are from where they are. In their words “we are from right here.” They do not believe in the historical migration theories of north to south or east to west, and are not interested in debating theories. To support their theory, a recent archeological find in Blackfoot territory dates Indian bones to be over 6,000 years old. The question of whether or not these are bones of Blackfeet ancestors still remains.

Similar to the other Northern Plains tribes, the Blackfeet were nomadic buffalo hunters who lived in tepees and roamed the plains. The Blackfoot territory was generally from the Canadian border south to the Missouri River. The Blackfeet sometimes allied with the Gros Ventre and Sarce, and their traditional enemies were the Crow, Shoshone, Cree, Sioux, Flathead, and Assiniboin.

APPENDIX G

Well Known Northern Plains Tribes

Northern Cheyenne Indians⁹⁴

The Northern Cheyenne Indians, like the Crow, originated from more sedentary origins in the east. However, once they were introduced to the horse in the 1700s the Cheyenne moved west and like the other Plains tribes and became nomadic hunters following the buffalo herds for food.

The Cheyenne were allies of the Arapaho and were enemies with the other Plains tribes. They eventually allied with the Sioux to fight against the Army. The Cheyenne were famous for their fierce fighting and their Dog Men warriors. The Dog Men were a military like society within the tribe known for their fighting skills.

Sioux Indians⁹⁵

The largest of the Northern Plains tribes, the Sioux have an extensive history that has been widely written on. The Sioux were also at one time a more sedentary group who fished in the rivers and harvested wild rice in Minnesota and the eastern Dakotas. They eventually moved west into the western Dakotas and eastern Montana. There, they became nomadic buffalo hunters.

Ironically the Sioux name came from the white man who called them Dakota or Lakota Sioux, which was a corruption of a Chippewa word meaning enemy. The Sioux were approximately 15,000 strong in the 19th century and had many historic battles with the U. S. Army as the incoming whites moved west and encroached on their territory. The legendary Sioux names of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse are still as well known today as they were in their own.

APPENDIX H

Timeline

Important Indian Events on the Northern Great Plains from late Civil War thru the Grant Administration

Sand Creek Massacre	November 29, 1864	Chivington's Third Colorado massacres Black Kettle's peaceful Cheyenne in Colorado.
Doolittle Committee	March 1865	Senator James Doolittle leads a joint congressional-military inquiry of "Sand Creek Massacre." The beginnings of Indian policy reform.
Red Cloud's War (also called The War for the Bozeman Trail)	June 1866-April 1868	Red Cloud and the Northern Sioux and Cheyenne fight to keep the Army and white settlers out of the Powder River Country route to the gold mines of Montana.
Fetterman Massacre	December 21, 1866	Captain William Fetterman and his 80 men are killed in an ambush by Crazy Horse and 1,000-1,500 Sioux Warriors.
Hancock's Campaign	April 1867-July 1867	Winfield Scott Hancock's columns pursue hostile Sioux and Cheyenne throughout the plains and fail to bring a major fight.
Indian Peace Commission of 1867	July 20, 1867	Congress passes an act to establish peace with hostile tribes.
Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868	April 29, 1868	Government signs peace treaty with Sioux and other Northern Plains tribes.
Sheridan's Campaign	September 1868-July 1869	Sheridan sends columns from New Mexico and Kansas to converge on Kiowa and Comanche in the Central and Southern Plains. Black Kettle's village on the Washita is massacred.

APPENDIX H

Timeline

Important Indian Events on the Northern Great Plains from late Civil War thru the Grant Administration

President Grant's Inauguration	March 4, 1869	Ulysses S. Grant sworn in as President and, to the dismay of his Generals, he advocates the Christian peace policy.
Gold Discovered in the Black Hills	July 1874	Custer's Seventh Cavalry on expedition discovers gold.
Sioux War for the Black Hills	1875-1881	Most famous of all Indian war campaigns. Encompassed the failed attempt of the government to lease the Black Hills, followed by an ultimatum for the Sioux to evacuate Black Hills (abandonment of Fort Laramie Treaty), followed by multiple battles, the most famous being Custer's Last Stand. Ultimately, triggered the outright abandonment of Grant's Peace Policy, and final defeat of the Sioux and their movement to reservations.

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- ⁷⁴ Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars*, 167.
- ⁷⁵ Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars*, 242.
- ⁷⁶ Gray, *Centennial Campaign*, 13.
- ⁷⁷ Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1904), 999. <http://digitallibrary.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/toc.htm>.
- ⁷⁸ Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1904), 1003. <http://digitallibrary.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/toc.htm>.
- ⁷⁹ Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties*, (Washington : Government Printing Office, 1904), 1002. <http://digitallibrary.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/toc.htm>.
- ⁸⁰ Axelrod, *Political History of America's Wars*, 242.
- ⁸¹ Gray, *Centennial Campaign*, 16.
- ⁸² Gray, *Centennial Campaign*, 23-31.
- ⁸³ Nabokov, *Native American Testimony*, 192.
- ⁸⁴ Gray, *Centennial Campaign*, 21.
- ⁸⁵ Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West*, 130.
- ⁸⁶ Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West*, 184.
- ⁸⁷ Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West*, 188-189.
- ⁸⁸ Utley, *The Indian Frontier of the American West*, 253-257.
- ⁸⁹ The Republic of Lakotah People, <http://www.republicoflakotah.com/>
- ⁹⁰ The Republic of Lakotah People, <http://www.republicoflakotah.com/>
- ⁹¹ Rick and Susie Graetz. *Crow Country: Montana's Crow Tribe of Indians*. (Billings, MT: Northern Rockies Publishing Company, 2000), <http://lib.lbhc.edu/about/history/plentyco.php>.
- ⁹² Colorado University, The Arapaho Project, <http://www.colorado.edu/csilw/arapahoproject/contemporary/history.htm>
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- ⁹⁵ Robert M. Utley, *The Lance and the Shield*, (New York, NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1993), 4.

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The primary sources listed below were very useful in conducting research on this topic. Prucha's *Documents of United States Indian Policy*, Simon's edition of *The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant* volumes 17-20, the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, and the Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs documents were particularly essential in providing context for the thoughts and actions of the individuals directly involved in dealing with the "Indian Problem" in the era from 1867 to 1876.

The primary documents used in my research ensured a broader understanding of the treaties, commissions, and individual's thoughts and opinions towards the issue. They revealed the foundations for the policies that were implemented. This approach helped to view the problem with an objective viewpoint.

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Axelrod, Alan. *Political History of America's Wars*. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.

Excellent source for providing a broad overview of the different Indian campaigns and policies. The history textbook technique of inserting small excerpts of primary source documents was helpful in order to focus in on certain documents and examine them further.

Birtle, Andrew J. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998.

Provides great insight in to the state of the Army on the frontier. It also gave excellent accounts of both the internal and external challenges the Army faced in the west. Finally Birtle shows the lack of doctrine and experience in counterinsurgency operations, which put the brave men serving on the frontier in very disadvantageous positions.

Clodfelter, Micheal. *The Dakota War: The United States Army Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1998.

Primarily used to gain an understanding to the Sioux disposition prior to the Grant Administration taking office. It also proved to be a good source on how the Sioux Nation originated and how its various bands evolved.

Graetz , Rick and Susie. *Crow Country: Montana's Crow Tribe of Indians*. Billings, MT: Northern Rockies Publishing Company, 2000. <http://lib.lbhc.edu/about/history/plentyco.php>.

Cited from the Little Big Horn Library website, it has excellent background, history and government information on the Crow Indians. Much of the information on the history of the Crow Indians on the website comes from Graetz's book.

Gray, John S. *Centennial Campaign, the Sioux War of 1876*. Fort Collins, CO: The Old Army Press, 1976.

A must read for anyone studying the Northern Plains Indians. Gray's use of primary resources and his scientific approach to retelling the details of the Sioux fight on the frontier are enlightening. His analysis of the politics at the time shed light on the complexities of the problems President Grant faced with the Plains Indians.

_____. *Custer's Last Campaign*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.

An extremely detailed and updated version of the *Centennial Campaign*. The book reflects many of the same interpretations as the *Centennial Campaign*, but breaks the battle down with graphs and detailed time analysis. Much of it is written through the eyes of the half Sioux Mitch

Boyer, who was born to a Sioux mother around 1837. Gray unfolds Boyer's story as he lived with the Sioux in the most pivotal time of their history. To understand the book requires a good understanding of the battle in order to follow through the sequence of events. This was a main source, which was based mainly on primary sources and written in an detached manner, so as to understand what occurred.

Jones, Archer. *Elements of Military Strategy, A Historical Approach*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.

Jones provides an excellent analysis of military strategy and how it changed throughout the different Indian conflicts. It was useful in determining how the Army approached the Indian fight, where they were successful, and where they failed. Jones especially addresses the key vulnerabilities of the indigenous peoples: their economy (or logistics).

Kennett, Lee. *Sherman: A Soldier's Life*. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2001.

Kennett provides a modern biography of General Sherman, which gives insight into many of Sherman's sometimes-contradictory remarks. Chapter 18 was particularly useful for Sherman's disposition as the Commander of the Department of Missouri and his opinions on the Northern Plains Indians.

Langguth, A. J. *Driven West: Andrew Jackson and the Trail of Tears to the Civil War*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2010.

Provides a background on the early 19th century policies of Indian removal but was not used.

Meyer, Roy W. *The Village Indians of the Upper Missouri: The Mandans, Hidatsas, and Arikaras*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1977.

Used to gain an understanding of the more sedentary tribes of the north, who tended to be more compliant with western expansion. It provided information on the lives of these sedentary peoples of the north but not pertinent to this study.

Nabokov, Peter, ed. *Native American Testimony: A Chronicle of Indian White Relations from Prophecy to the Present, 1492-1992*. New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 1991.

A great source for giving the Indian side of the issue associated with "the problem." Nabokov's collection of interviews and old government transcripts was of great use in building context on the Crow and Sioux Indians feelings towards the government policies.

Prucha, Francis Paul. *American Indian Policy in Crisis: Christian Reformers and the Indian, 1865-1900*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976.

This is another must read for anyone studying the Indian Wars. Prucha provides an excellent breakdown on the establishment of Indian policies and how these changed over time as previous ones failed.

_____. *The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1984.

The book is a more expansive version of *American Indian Policy in Crisis* and covers a much broader time period. It combines Prucha's many years of Indian study into one work and was an essential source that was used extensively.

Reilly, Hugh J. *The Frontier Newspapers and the Coverage of the Plains Indian Wars*, Santa Barbra, CA: Praeger, 2010.

Reilly's book is a significant assessment of the Plains Indian Wars from the viewpoint of the public opinion of the time using the newspapers of the late 1800s. It was particularly useful towards my project in order to acquire an understanding of the public's opinion of the Fort Laramie Treaty and the Little Big Horn Campaign.

Remini, Robert V. *Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars*. New York, NY: Viking Penguin, 2001.

Remini provides excellent insight and context into the formative years of Indian policy and the great lengths taken to remove the Indians to the West.

Stewart, Richard W. ed. *American Military History Vol 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2005.

A useful volume which provided an overview of the Army's involvement in the Indian conflicts. Stewart also provides some very useful information on Indian scouts.

Utey, Robert M. *Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1973.

Another must read for anyone studying Indian affairs. Utey provides a great assessment of the Army's role as the constabulary force of the west.

_____. *Frontiersmen in Blue, The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Another necessary source used to gain a full understanding of the Army's involvement in the Indian conflicts. This work was outside of the time frame of this project, but was very useful in providing insight into the origins of the first major conflicts of the Northern Plains Indians.

_____. *The Indian Frontier of the American West, 1846-1890*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.

This book again falls into the category of a must read for study of Indian Wars of the west. This particular work of Utley's was used extensively in this project and I found it to be an excellent examination of the challenges the United States faced as it expanded into the frontier of the trans-mississippi west.

Utley, Robert M. and Wilcomb E. Washburn. *Indian Wars*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1987.

A well-written volume that is more of an overview of all the Indian Wars and not as detailed as Utley's other works that focus on narrower time periods. It helped in gaining an understanding of the Sioux and their disposition towards the government.

Wooster, Robert. *The Military and United States Indian Policy 1865-1903*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1988.

A significant book pertaining directly to the United States use of the Army in implementing government policy. It assesses the problems with the policies of the era and the individuals, both Army and civilian, who administered the policies.

_____. *The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783-1900*. Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2009.

Another outstanding account of the Army and the many roles it fulfilled throughout the 19th century. Unfortunately, Wooster's most recent work was acquired late in my study so it was minimally used. Nonetheless, it is an excellent and relevant work to this area of study and many of Wooster's thoughts are captured in my paper.

The Republic of Lakotah People, <http://www.republicoflakotah.com/>

Website used for the current state of Sioux Indians. It details many of the challenges the reservations currently face and the statistics associated with them. The website also has information on the current legal battles some of the Lakotah people are waging in attempt to gain sovereignty from the United States.